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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

J. J. N. P. COMPANY,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

Supreme Court
No. 17183

STATE OF UTAH by and
through the Division of
Wildlife Resources,
DefendantResponden t.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by the plaintiff to test the
constitutionality of a section of the Aquatic Wildlife Act of
Utah, 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended by the
session laws of 1971.

The defendant counterclaimed and sought

to have the court determine whether or not all waters within
the State of Utah are subject to an easement for recreational
purposes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court rules that §23-15-10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended by the session laws of 1971 was
constitutional and that further a certain road was a public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2road.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the jdugment and the
entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a Utah limited partnership which owns
a large tract of real property utilized for a cattle

ranchi~

operation in Duchesne County, Utah in an area commonly known
as Lake Canyon.

(R-299)

Situated in Lake Canyon is a natural lake known as
Lake Canyon Lake.
Lake Canyon Lake is approximately 700 yards long
and approximately 180 yards wide and is at an elevation of
6,698 feet above sea level and approximately 20 feet deep
at its greatest depth.

(R-51)

The lake is fed by natural

springs in the bed of the lake and by a small stream which
has its head waters approximately six miles above the lake
on a quarter section of land owned by the State of Utah.

The

stream after flowing out of the state lands enters the
plaintiff's property and flows into the lake.

The lake has

an intermittent stream which flows out of the lake during
high water in the spring of the year and flows for approximately 200 or 300 yards where it then disappears into the

ground.

The stream which flows into the lake is approximately

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l

-32 or 3 inches deep and approximately 24 to 36 inches in width
during its full course from where it originates from springs
on the state land until it enters Lake Canyon Lake.

The water

flowing from this spring comprises approximately 25% of the
water flowing into the lake. (R-311)

The rest being from

springs either under or along the lake itself.

The stream

leaving the lake is again of the approximate same size.
The plaintiff owns all of the land surrounding the
lake and for several miles below the lake and approximately
6 or 7 miles upwards from the lake.
The plaintiff claims that it has appropriated all
waters within the lake either through diligence claims arising
prior to 1903, (R-341) through its predecessors in interest or
through filing with the State Engineer's Office. (Ex. 14)
A class B county road runs from the Strawberry River
up Lake Canyon and past the lake and into Indian Reservation
and U.S. forest lands at the canyon's head.
Plaintiff contended that the road was a private road
and that it had, in the past, placed a gate across the road
and locked the same. (R-320)

Upon demand of Duchesne County

the plaintiff removed the lock that left the gates in tact.
(R-324)
The plaintiff's predecessor in interest to the land
surrounding Lake canyon Lake had entered into a contract with
the State Division of Wildlife Resources in May of 1973 whereby the State agreed to stock the lake with fish and the public
was allowed to fish on the lake for a period of five years
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-4during the winter season by means of "ice fishing".
43, 322)

(R-42,

The state normally had its fishing season fixed fw

Lake Canyon Lake during the months of January and February.
This contract ran for five years and expirea' in May of 1978.
(R-321)
After the plaintiff acquired the lands

surroundi~

Lake Canyon Lake and the expiration of the agreement with

t~

Utah State Division of Wildlife Resources, the plaintiff
declined to enter into a new agreement with the state and
applied for the certificate of registration from the Division
of Wildlife Resources to create a private fish installation
on Lake Canyon Lake.

(R-329-332)

The State Division of Wildlife Resources rejected
the plaintiffs application based upon its regulations that

lt

had drafted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act

and pursuant to 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as

amended by the session laws of 1971 wherein it provides,
inter alia:
" ... and no such installation shall be developed
on natural lakes or natural flowing streams, or ,
reservoirs constructed on natural stream channels.
The plaintiff had posted its property to prohibit
fishing on Lake Canyon Lake pursuant to 23-20-14, since it
acquired the lands in question.

(R-320)

The plaintiff then commenced an action to determine
the constitutionality of 23-15-10, and the state counterclaime:
claiming that all waters within the State of Utah are subject
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to an easement for recreational purposes.

-5At the time of trial there was one other natural
lake on Lake Canyon Lake located in what is known as the
Rabbit Gulch Quadrangle (R-301) which lake was in fact a
private fish hatchery.

This lake is commonly known as

"Lower Lake" and is approximately 3 miles down canyon from
Lake Canyon Lake.

The justification given by the state

witnesses for allowing Lower Lake to be utilized as a private
fish hatchery was that it had become one prior to the adoption of the Aquatic Wildlife Act in 1971.

The state's

witnesses further testified that improvements and enlargement of the facility had been permitted from time to time.
(R-421-423)
Mr. Don Andriana, Chief of the Fishery Section of
the Division of Wildlife Resources testified that he had
personally drafted 23-15-10 which was adopted by the State
Legislature in 1971 and that the purpose and reasoning
behind the drafting and adoption of 23-15-10 was that public
water should be used for public enjoyment and that land ownership, per se, should not be the governing factor whether or
not public waters should be used by the public or access to
them should not be denied.

That due to the perceived increase

in population of the state it was required that the natural
waters be perserved for the public.

(R-423)

The witness further testified that the problem of
trash fish getting into the natural water courses and other
waters of the state were not considered in the drafting of
23-15-10.

(R-430)

The witness further testified that he was
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-6well aware that many lakes in the state were totally surrounc;
by private lands at the time that he drafted 23-15-10.
The court heard testimony that the lake was susceptible to fishing and that small boats could be launched in

it,

however, there was no provision or launching ramp for doing s:
The matter having been submitted to the court for
its determination the court made its memorandum decision on
June 2, 1980 (R 164-165) wherein the court found that Lake
Canyon Lake is a natural lake and that it has been used by
te general public for recreation for a long time and is completely surrounded by property owned by the plaintiff.

The

court then found that §23-15-10 was not unconstitutional

a~

that the denial of plaintiffs application was a lawful denial
by the State Division of Wildlife Resources.

The court furthe::

went on and held that the road beginning at the mouth of Lake
Canyon and acceding up the canyon to the national forest
boundary was private road.
The court in its findings of fact and conclusions
of law went further than the actual decree and held that all
waters in the State of Utah in natural water courses are
public waters subject to public uses as the waters are reason- '
ably susceptible including fishing and other recreational m~
provided, however, that such public reights are exercised wi~
out impairing existing water rights and without trespassing
on adjoining private property.

(R 180)

The court went on and held that waters in the State
of Utah are subject to .a public servitude for fishing and othe:'
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recreational purposes.

(R-181)

__J

-7From the court's judgment plaintiff filed its appeal
on the 8th day of July 1980.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
23-15-10, U.C.A. 1953 AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
Section 23-15-10, U.C.A. 1953 as amended by the session
laws of 1971 provides:
"23-15-10.
Private fish installation. -- It is
unlawful for any person to develop or operate
private fish installation without first securing
a certificateof registration from the Division
of Wildlife Resources and payment of fees as
specified by the Wildlife Board.
This private
fish installation must be operated upon the
rules and regulations specified by the Wildlife
Board, and no such installation shall be
developed on natural lakes or natural flowing
streams, or reservoirs constructed on natural
stream channels."
Plaintiff contends that this particular provision of
the statute is unconstitutional in that the provision that "no
such installation shall be developed on natural lakes or
natural flowing streams, or reservoirs constructed on natural
stream channels.", is violative of the equal protection clauses
of the Utah and United States Constitution (14th Amendment) in
that it creates an invidious discrimination between persons
owning real property and operating a private fish installation
on streams or lakes not located on natural lakes or natural
flowing streams and those who would attempt to construct private installations on natural lake and natural flowing streams.
In the case of Cannon vs. Oviatt (1974, Utah) 520 P
2d 883,
the Supreme Court observed:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8-

"Furthermore, the equal protection clause does
not compel the state to attack every aspect of
a problem or to refrain from any action at all·
it is sufficient that the state action be
'
rationally based and free from invidious discrimination."
Surprisingly, this section of Utah law was not
adopted for the protection of aquatic wildlife within the
state.

The sole reason for its adoption was to provide the

public with places to fish.
At the same time that the legislature was adopting
§23-15-10 under the guise that it needed to provide the public
with places to fish it also passed §23-20-14 which denied t~
public the right of access to these same waters that it was
claiming necessary to perserve for the public in 23-15-10.
23-20-14, U.C.A. 1953 as amended by the session lm
of 1971 prohibits anyone from entering onto lands posted
the property owner as not open for hunting or fishing.

~

Furthe:

the legislature made it a class B misdemeanor to enter onto
such posted lands.

Subsection (2) of 23-20-14 reads:

"(2)
Property shall be deemed posted properly
when 'No Trespassing' signs are displayed at approx·
imately 1/4 mile intervals along the exterior
boundaries and at all corners and at all fishing
streams that cross property lines and along all
roads and trails, and rights-of-way entering such
land."
Under subsection (5) of 23-20-14 it is provided:
"The restriction pertaining to trespassing shall
be made a part of all hunting and fishing proclamations issued by the Wildlife Board."
The legislature even went further in 23-10-15 and
adopted a law which provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-9"It is unlawful for any person, without consent
of the owner or person in charge of any privately
owned.land, .to tear down, mutilate, or destroy
any sign, sign board, or other notice which
regulates trespassing for purposes of hunting,
trapping or fishing on this land;"
Mr. Andriana at the time that he drafted 23-14-10
knew that many lakes in the State of Utah were totally surrounded by private property and in spite of this and in spite of the
fact that trespassing across such private property was specifically outlawed.under 23-20-14 still, he asserted that the sole
0

reason for the adoption of 23-15-10 was to provide the public
with the right to fish the natural lakes of this state.
It is easily seen that this is a paradox which results
in the invidious discrimination which makes 23-15-10 unconstitutional.
The classification of not allowing a private fish
hatchery on the natural lake but permitting one on a man-made
lake creates a classification which rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objectives,
which was the allowing of the public the free access and right
to fish waters in natural lakes.
The Supreme Court of the United States had an occasion to pass upon this question in the case of Lindsey vs. Norrnet,
(1972)

405 U.S. 56, 31 L.Ed 2d 36, 92 S.Ct. 862 wherein the

court stated:
"The statute potentially applied to all tenan~s,
rich an poor, commercial and non~cornrnercial; it
cannot be faulted for overexcessiveness or underexcessiveness. And classifying tenants of real
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-10property differently from other tenants for purposes o~ possessary actions will offend the equal
protections safeguard 'only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective.' "
(Citing cases.)
The state has the burden of demonstrating that a
statute which is attacked on the grounds of equal protectioo,
is necessary to promote a compelling government interest and
the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asser:
ive purposes.

Dunn vs Blumstein,

(1972)

405 U.S. 330, 31 L.::

2d 274, 92 S.Ct. 995.
In restating thegeneral principles of law laid dow1
with respect to equal protection cases, the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Eisenstadt vs. Baird, (1972:
405 U.S.

438 31 L.Ed. 2d 349,92 S.Ct. 1029 stated:
"The basic principles governing application of the'
equal protection laws of the Fourteenth Amendment
are familiar.
As the chief justice only recently
explained in Reed vs. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 78-76, JO
L.Ed. 2d 225, 229, 92 S.Ct. 251 (1971):
'In apply·
ing that clause this court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny
to states the power to treat different classes of
persons in different ways.'"
(Citing authority)
"The equal protection clause of that amendment
does, however, deny to states the power to legislat:
that different treatment be accorded to persons
placed by a statute in different classes on the .
basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the object1n
of that statute.
A classification 'must be reason~
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some grounc
of difference, have a fair and substantial relat1oc
to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstances shall be treated
alike. '"
(Ci ting cases.)
The question that now must be determined by this cc::

is whether there is some grounds of difference that rationa~
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-11explains the different treatment accorded those who desire to
operate a private fish installation to be constructed on a
natural water course as opposed to hose who wish to construct
a private fish installation on a man-made or non-natural water
course.
As stated before, the legitimate State purpose of
23-15-10 was to allow the public access to the fishing waters
of this state.

However, this stated purpose is obviated by

23-20-14 which allows a property owner or property owners who
own the land around a natural lake to prohibit the public from
crossing

their land to get to the lake for fishing purposes.

Obviously, the stated purpose fails.
by the state was not true.

The classification adopted

Vance v. Bradley (1979) 440 U.S. 93,

59 L.Ed 2d 171, 99 S.Ct. 939, and therefore such classification
is a violation of equal protections.
The state in an affidavit filed with the court on
July 23, 1979 (R-42) alluded to the fact that fish could migrate
up the stream onto lands owned by the State and also the fish
could migrate down stream from the lake.

This was totally

refudiated by not only the testimony of the plaintiff's general
partner but also by the defendant's witnesses themselves who
stated that the water was only 2 to 3 inches deep and no fish
could migrate either up stream (R-355, stipulation) nor down
stream.

The assertion of the State that the fish could in fact

migrate in the earlier affidavit was an attempt to show that
the intended purpose for which the section under attack was
drafted was for the protection of the fishing waters of the
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-12state so that trash fish or other undesirable fish could not
migrate into other bodies of water.

However, as protection

of the waters of the State of Utah was not the reason for the
adoption of the section of law in question, therefore this
will not be further addressed.
Plaintiff contends that the classification of fish
hatcheries being permitted on private lakes but not on natur 0:
lakes is not based on any reasonable basis and is

essential~

arbitrary.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Justice vs.
Standard Gilsonite Company (1961)

12 U 2d 357, 366 P 2d 974

observed:
"We recognize as correct the rules stated in 12
Am Jur 216 and 217 §521 as follows:

'One who assails the classifications in
a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest on any reasonable
basis, that is essentially arbitrary ... '"
" ... Before a court can interfere with the
legislative judgment, it must be able to say
that there is no fair reason for the law that
would not require with equal force its extention to others whom it leaves untouched ... "
(Citing Utah cases.)
In the case of Abrahamsen vs. Board of Review, Indus· I
trial Commission, 3 u. 2d 289, 283 P 2d 213, the Supreme court
ruled:
"The standard to be followed in the determination of this question was set by the case of
State vs. Mason, 94 u. 501, 78 P.2d 920, 923,
117 ALR 330:
'A classification is never unreasonable
or arbitrary in its inclusion or
exclusion features so long as there
is some basis for the differentiation
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-13between classes or subject matter
included as compared to those
excluded from its operations, provided
the differentiation bares a reasonable
relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act ... '
"In order to see whether the excluded classes
or transactions are on a different basis then
those included, we must look at the purpose of
the act.
The objects and purposes of a law
present the touchstone for determining proper
or improper classification ...
"It is only where some persons or transaction
excluded from the operation of the law or as
to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class from those included in its operation that the law is discriminatory in the
sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional.
If a reasonable basis to differentiate those
included from those excluded from its operation
can be found, it must be held constitutional."
The legislature gave jurisdiction of the Division of
Wildlife Resources over both public and private lands and
waters.

23-14-2, U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
Why is there is distinction drawn between natural and

non-natural or man-made lakes?
able basis for this distinction?

What is the rational or reasonIt is submitted that there is

none.
As stated in Crowder vs. Salt Lake County (1976, Utah)
552 P.2d 646:
"The constitutional safeguard of equal protection is offended only if the classif ication rests upon a ground not relative to
the state's objective." This case then cites
McGowan vs. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct.
1101, 6 L.Ed 2d 393.
The avowed reason for the state to adopt this particular section was to allow access to the public to natural
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-14lakes which it then denied the public that access :Oy §23- 20 _ :
1
There is no valid reason for this classification and because
there is none the statute must fall.

State vs. Twitchell, 8

U.2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075, State vs. Cassas, 97 U. 492, 94 P.2d
414, Baker v. Matheson (1979, Utah)

607 P.2d 233.

Section 23-15-10 in actuality is affecting real pro·
perty and not the water which may rest upon that real

propert~.

Section 73-1-1, U.C.A. 1953 as amended states:
"All waters in this state, whether above or under
the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof."
Section 23-14-10 states that'no such installation
shall be developed on natural lakes or natural flowing

stre~!

or reservoirs constructed on natural stream channels," but
says nothing with respect to the waters.

Consequently, what

the state in actuality is doing is regulating the use of rea;
property.

There is no question but what the stream bed, or

lake bed belongs to the abutting land owner, unless it can
be shown that the lake or stream is a navigable body of water.
Monroe, et. al. vs. State et. al.

(1946)

111 U. 1, 175 P.2d

759.
Section 65-1-14 U.C.A. 1953 as amended specifically
states:
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed as
a legislative declaration of ownership by the
land of beds of non-naviqable lakes, bays thereof.
of of beds of non-navigable rivers or streams."
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-15The trial court found as a matter of law that the
lake bed in question did in fact belong to the plaintiff and
with this plaintiff does not quarrel.

What the plaintiff

does quarrel with is a distinction asserted by the state for
land which may have located on it a natural body of water as
opposed to a man-made body of water.
It is difficult to rationalize or see what difference
there may be between water which is situated on a natural lake
but has been appropriated for use by the filing of applications
for appropriation and the granting of those applications to
water which may be situated in a man-made channel or in a manmade pond or lake but which has not been appropriated by the
filing of appropriate applications or the granting of the same.
Appellant does not dispute that the state does have
the right to manage its wildlife resources, however, in managing those wildlife resources the state may not indulge in discrimination.
436 U.S.

Baldwin vs. Montana Fish and Game Commission (1978)

371 56 L.Ed 2d 354, 98 s.ct. 1852.
The state's argument for maintaining the constitution-

ality of 23-15-10 seems to be based upon a mixing of apples and
oranges, or the use of real property as opposed to use of unappropriated public waters, although in the present case, the
waters of Lake Canyon Lake have in fact been either appropriated
by the plaintiff through his diligence rights or he has a paramount right to the use thereof by reason of his pending application for appropriation.
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-16The use of water within the State of Utah is contr:
basically, by the State Engineer and the attempt of the Sta~
Division of Wildlife Resources to inject itself into the ~~
ment of the water resources of this state is contrary to ln.
It is respectfully submitted that there being no
able or rational basis for the distinction between

k

man-ma~~

natural waterways the statute in question, 23-15-10, must be
held unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection

~·

visisions of the Utah and United States Constitutions.
POINT II
THE STATE WRONGFULLY DENIED PLAINTIFF A PERMIT
TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN A PRIVATE FISHERY INSTALLATION ON LAKE CANYON LAKE.
The state denied the plaintiff's applciation for
authority to construct a private fish installation based upon
its rules and regulations which it had adopted pursuant to
provisions of 23-15-10.

t~

Copies of those rules and regulations

are found at Record 6 through 10.

As the section of law under

which these regulations were implemented is unconstitutional,
the regulations themselves must fail and therefore the plain·
tiff is entitled to a Writ of Mandate to compel the state to
issue to him a permit to construct and maintain a private fisf:
installation on Lake Canyon Lake.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ROAD BEGINNING
AT THE MOUTH OF LAKE CANYON AND EXTENDING UP THE
CANYON TO THE NATIONAL FOREST BOUNDARY WAS A
PUBLIC ROAD.
The plaintiff in his complaint did not raise the iss:
of whether or not the road running from the Strawberry River~
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-17Lake Canyon Lake to the forest lands was a public or private
road.

Likewise in the counterclaim of the defendant this

issue was not raised.

(R 14-16)

Nowhere in any of the pleadings is there any question
raised with respect to this road and its status, that is whether
it is a public or private way.
No motion was made under Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to try this issue nor to conform the pleadings to
the proof adduced.
It is respectfully submitted that the court's determination as to the status of this road is totally without
the scope of the pleadings and therefore should be reversed.
National Farmers Union Property vs. Thompson, 4 U 2d 7, 283
Prd 249.

The question of whether the road was a public way

was an entirely new cause of action and therefore should not
have been tried.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that 23-15-10 of the
Aquatic Wildlife Act of Utah, is unconstitutional and therefore should be struck down.
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred
in ruling on a matter which was not properly before it, with
respect to the status of the road running near the lake and
that therefore the court's judgment should be reversed with
respect thereto.
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-18Matters raised in the findings of fact and conclusic:.
of law with respect to whether or not there is a servitude oi I
all of the waters of the State of Utah for an easement for

~l

use for fishing and recreational purposes was not incorporated '
into the court's j~dgment and therefore plaintiff-appellant wi:.1·
not address these issues as they are not germaine to the issue;
before the court based upon the court's judgment.
Further, questions with respect to the

question~

navigability of Lake Canyon Lake are also not addressed,

t~

court not having entered a judgment and order with respect the:'
to, even though the court in its findings of fact and conclusi:·
of law did address these matters.

Respectfully subm,itted,

td/

/,·
'"L--s:h~ ~

///

PAUL N. COTRO-MAi~ES
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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